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Abstract. Disputes over causes play a central role in legal argumenta-
tion and liability attribution. Legal approaches to causation often strug-
gle to capture cause-in-fact in complex situations, e.g. overdetermination,
preemption, omission. In this paper, we first assess three current theo-
ries of causation (but-for, NESS, ‘actual causation’) to illustrate their
strengths and weaknesses in capturing cause-in-fact. Secondly, we intro-
duce a semi-formal framework for modelling causal arguments through
strict and defeasible rules. Thirdly, the framework is applied to the Al-
then vaccine injury case. And lastly, we discuss the need for new crite-
ria based on a common causal argumentation framework and propose
ideas on how to integrate the current theories of causation to assess the
strength of causal arguments, while also acknowledging the tension be-
tween evidence-based and policy-based causal analysis in law.
Keywords: argumentation, causation, evidence, law, legal reasoning
1 Introduction
Disputes over causes play a central role in legal argumentation. In particular,
lawyers and judges are interested in explanations of causal links from the out-
come to its causes and how these explanations can be linked to the evidence
and parties involved in the case. Questions such as – who injured the victim or
what caused the fire in the house – are commonplace in legal discourse. How-
ever, the theoretical foundation for causal argument assessment in law is lacking.
Researchers [24] have struggled for decades to explain some of the complex the-
oretical phenomena that come with reasoning from the effects to causes. For
instance, how to establish a causal link in cases of inaction, or what is the cause
in situations where two (or more) parties had a partial role in some overall causal
action? The issue of causation in law is both practical, with the limited guidance
provided to the decision makers who need to balance the opposing arguments
in establishing causal links, and theoretical, with the competing causal theories
unable to accurately capture causes in complex situations.
? Corresponding author: Ruta.Liepina@EUI.eu, ORCiD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
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This study investigates how people reason and argue about causes in le-
gal cases. In particular, we analyse the language and arguments used by the
medical expert witnesses and judges in a vaccine injury case. To assess and un-
derstand causal arguments presented in the case, we first consider two issues
of complex causal phenomena, overdetermination and preemption, and how the
current causal theories explain the phenomena. Namely, we analyse the but-for
counterfactual test [12], Hart and Honore´’s [11] necessity and sufficiency test,
and Halpern and Pearl’s [10] structural ‘actual causation’ test. After evaluating
the strengths and weaknesses of these theories, we present our causal frame-
work, which is designed to model arguments about causation in a legal case. In
our framework, causal models encompass various strengths of belief in causal
links and represent the structure of the causal arguments as observed in the
arguments. We abstract the arguments through a semi-formal framework that
employs defeasible logic as well as introduce basic notions of causal relations
that are linked to evidential arguments in the cases. By modelling and assessing
legal arguments about causation, we seek to better understand which underlying
causal structures are present in the legal arguments.
Our causal framework4 contributes to the current developments in legal rea-
soning and argumentation research in at least two ways. Firstly, by systemat-
ically examining causation in legal arguments, we are able to uncover implicit
premises and argumentation steps in expert witness testimonies, allowing for an
explicit, structured comparison between the opposing views. Secondly, we model
the causal links found in the arguments through a new semi-formal framework
and propose an assessment of the causal links based on the current theories of
causation. Our strategy in using the causal theories is not to choose one over the
other in all possible cases. Rather it is to choose the most efficient approach for
the scenario at hand. For instance, if the simple but-for test is able to correctly
capture the cause in a case, then a full formal analysis by the ‘actual causation’
theory is not needed. In the same vein, a clear reasoning path in complex cases,
where there can be multiple causes interacting over a long period of time, is
essential for building sound arguments for parties in the case. Furthermore, a
domain of medical causation often involves highly specialised evidence presented
by the experts, leaving the judges with the increased burden of assessing the ar-
guments. A potential development of the proposed framework is to extend it into
causal argument schemes that include some of the core reasoning patterns for
the most common causal issues (multiple causes, preemption, omission) and to
pose critical questions for assessing them. While the current analysis is mostly
concerned with the initial steps of legal decision making, i.e. establishing the
cause-in-fact based on the evidence available, we are also interested in the role
of normative reasoning in restricting or broadening the causal test for liability
attribution.
4 Different versions of the framework have been presented at the Evidence and Decision
Making Workshop, ICAIL, 2017, London and AICOL Workshop, JURIX, 2017. This
paper presents the latest developments of the framework to date.
The paper is presented in three main sections. We start by laying out the
background and running case examples of the study, as well as introducing and
assessing the causal theories. In section 3, we introduce our semi-formal frame-
work and model causal arguments of the Althen vaccine injury case. We conclude
the paper by discussing the need for new criteria for assessing causal arguments
in law and presenting an early proposal for extending the framework.
2 Background
Causation is one of the fundamental concepts of human reasoning, it allows us
to connect events in a meaningful way. In this study we investigate two aspects
of causation: the logical structure of cause-in-fact and argumentation strategies
used to discuss causes in law. We first introduce the dominant philosophical and
formal theories that define ways causal links can be established based on various
forms of logic. We present three approaches in order of increasing complexity:
the but-for test, Hart and Honore´’s NESS test, and Halpern and Pearl’s ‘ac-
tual causation’ theory. To illustrate the differences between these approaches we
consider three classic causal scenarios: direct causation, overdetermination and
preemption. Secondly, we show how these causal theories can be used to assess
arguments about causation.
What is important to note is that our semi-formal framework does not restrict
the use to only one causal theories, rather the idea is to have the freedom to
choose between them for the best-fit for the scenario at hand. For instance, if the
link between the medication and recovery can be established by a simple but-for
test, there is no need to apply the more elaborate NESS or ‘actual causation’
tests. Thirdly, we introduce the case study of the Althen vaccine injury case. We
consider the argumentation strategies used in the case, focusing on the language
used by the medical expert witnesses and the judge.
2.1 Examples
We start by introducing three classical examples found in the causation litera-
ture [24]. Direct causation is an instance where the link between the event and
the effect is uninterrupted; overdetermination where there are two or more causes
for the same effect; and preemption where one event preempts the following event
in causing the effect.
Simple (Direct) Causation. In a simple (direct) causal scenario there is only
one cause and one effect. Think of a scenario where Anne gets a headache and
takes an aspirin (TA) [19]. Just a few minutes later, she already feels the effects
of the pill: the headache is gone (HG). The effect of the aspirin pill was direct
and uninterrupted. While simple causal events happen often, there are many
other conditions that might come into play complicating the original scenario.
Moreover, in legal discussions it is usually the causation of the more complex
nature that raises issues for disputes.
TA HG
Fig. 1. Direct causation
Overdetermination. The multiple causes, or the overdetermination, effect oc-
curs when there is more than one cause sufficient for the outcome. The classical
example chosen here is that of a firing squad, where two soldiers (S1 and S2)
are instructed to aim and shoot at the same prisoner to carry out the death
penalty. Assuming that both shooters are accurate and shoot at the same time,
they both cause the death of the prisoner (PD). However, each of their shots
alone would have been sufficient for killing the prisoner. Who caused the death
of the prisoner in this scenario? Different causal theories lead to conflicting con-
clusions. Multiple causes also appear in many medical situations. For instance,
when two (or more) alternative treatments independently cure the illness, but
these are applied together causing the patient to recover.
S1
S2
PD
Fig. 2. Overdetermination
Pre-emption. Preemption is a special instance of overdetermination cases, as
it also concerns conditions that are independently sufficient for the outcome.
The key difference here is in the order of events. While in overdetermination
we assume that the actions happened simultaneously or at least in a way that
the agents are not able to change their actions before the effect takes place,
then in preemption scenarios there is an order of events such that one action
preempts the other. We will use the example of rock throwing [9] to illustrate
this phenomenon. Suzy and Billy play a game where they both throw rocks
at a bottle. Suzy throws (ST) and her rock hits (SH) and shatters the bottle
(BS), while Billy’s throw (BS) comes right after and does not (BH) shatter the
bottle, since the bottle has already been shattered. The graphical order of the
lines in Figure 3 reflects this showing all possible events and their interactions.
However, Billy’s rock would have hit the bottle if Suzy’s rock had not reached
the bottle first. While we might intuitively have an idea about the cause-in-fact
in this case, causal theories have struggled to accommodate these relations by
providing either too strict or too loose criteria for the cause.
ST
BT
SH
BH
BS
time
Fig. 3. Preemption
2.2 Theories of Causation
Causation is a widely researched field [2], however only some discussions are
relevant to legal analysis. Here, we discuss three approaches to causal analy-
sis, starting with the simple counterfactual but-for test. We then introduce two
more advanced causal theories: Hart and Honore´’s [11] theory of necessary and
sufficient conditions and Halpern and Pearl’s [10] structural approach to ‘actual
causation’. The differences between these approaches are illustrated through their
ability to analyse the causal examples.
But-for test. A common way of thinking about causation in everyday and
legal reasoning is the but-for causation or sine qua non test. It considers what
could have been the outcome if only one aspect of an event in question was
different from the original scenario. In other words, one engages in counterfactual
reasoning of the kind: had a not happened, b would not have happened. If
one accepts the reasoning, one has shown that a is an essential element in the
occurrence of b. This approach is very effective in showing the impact of a single
change in the chain of reasoning. However, it has been repeatedly shown that the
necessity conditions are insufficient to capture more detailed causal relations [11,
17].
For instance, modelling the firing squad example in the but-for test would
lead to conclusion that none of the shooters was the cause. Recall that both S1
and S2 independently caused the prisoner’s death (PD). To qualify as a but-for
cause, each of the shooters would have to be necessary for killing the target.
Essentially, to successfully pass the but-for test one should be able to claim that
had shooter one not shot the prisoner, the prisoner would not have died. However,
such a conclusion is false in this scenario, because the prisoner would still have
died due to the second shooter hitting the target. Similarly in the preemption
example, the but-for test is too broad to pick out the cause: the bottle would
still have been shattered, even if Suzy missed the target, because Billy’s rock
followed right after and would have shattered the bottle instead. Scenarios like
these require a more restrictive test to pick out the cause.
Hart and Honore´’s NESS. A more elaborate approach to causal analysis was
proposed by the legal philosophers H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore´ in Causation
in the Law [11]. Their approach, NESS, focuses on sets of sufficient conditions
in determining the cause. The supporters [28] of the NESS view argue that in
“a specific situation a causally relevant condition is a necessary element of a set
of conditions jointly sufficient for the harmful outcome”. In other words, NESS
searches for minimal sets of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome. If an
element is necessary for the sufficiency of the set, then it is considered to be the
actual cause. Similar reasoning has also been used in the legal discourse. For the
assessment and comparison of alternative causal models, the NESS approach uses
the idea of commonsense generalisations about causal links [12]. In particular,
the comparison is conducted between the instantiations of such generalisations
and how well these instantiations conform with the general case.
The distinction between the necessary and sufficient conditions allows us to
capture more complex causal relations compared to the but-for necessity test.
In the firing squad example, NESS models each shot as a necessary element of
minimally sufficient sets of conditions for the prisoner’s death. In other words,
according to NESS both shooters contributed to causing the death of the pris-
oner. Attributing blame to each of the shooters also follows the intuitions held
in law. However, NESS test fails to model the cause in preemption scenarios.
In the rock throwing example, Suzy’s rock preempts Billy’s hitting the bottle
by shattering it first. An accurate model should capture that the rock reaching
the bottle first is the actual cause. Interestingly, the causal approaches chosen
here do not explicitly present the temporal elements in causal relations. Instead,
the discussions revolve around the dependencies between the events. Therefore,
the fact that Suzy’s rock reaches the bottle before Billy’s is captured by saying
that Billy’s rock hits if and only if Suzy’s rock does not. These nuances, which
capture the structural and temporal order of events, are missing from the NESS
sufficiency test, making it difficult to model the intuitions about Billy’s throw.
Halpern and Pearl’s ‘Actual Causation’. Causation holds a central role in
the artificial intelligence and law research. I.e. causal explanations and predic-
tions help understanding and modelling legal reasoning and legal responsibility
attribution [14]. This matter has been approached from various perspectives,
including argumentation [26, 27], logic [13, 15, 25], statistics [6], and new, task
specific approaches [8, 18]. In this paper, we investigate the ways Halpern and
Pearl’s (HP) theory of ‘actual causation’ can explain the causal links found in
the case law. They provide a formal approach to causal analysis; they model
causation by combining necessary and sufficient conditions, interventions and
counterfactual reasoning. An extended version of HP ‘actual causation’ allows
comparing alternative explanations based on notions of normality, typicality and
defaults.
Here we provide a simplified introduction to their theory (for the full defini-
tions see [10]), and illustrate it though an example concerning preemption.
A causal model M , according to HP, consists of a set of variables and a
set of structural equations. The equations determine how the values of certain
variables depend on the values of other variables. The variables whose values
are dependent on other values are called endogenous, the independent variables
(whose value is determined outside of the model) are called exogenous. Only
endogenous variables can be causes. For instance, in modelling the lighting of a
candle, lighting a match may be modelled as an endogenous variable, while the
humidity and temperature of the room may be modelled as exogenous variables.
Atomic events are modelled as assertions on the values of a variable; for
instance the proposition that Billy throws a stone is modelled as BT = 1, where
BT is a boolean variable and 1 means “true”. In our model concerning two
children, Billy and Suzy throwing rocks at the bottle, the exogenous variables
are the set of circumstances that determine whether each child throws a stone or
not. For instance we may denote such circumstances as CS (the circumstances
in which Suzy throws) and CB (the circumstances in which Billy throws). Let us
assume that the endogenous variables are ST (Suzy throws), BT (Billy throws),
SH (Suzy hits), BH (Billy hits), BS (bottle shattered).
The structural equations are the following, where max is a function that
takes two (or more) input values and outputs the maximum value, and min is a
function that takes two (or more) input values and outputs the minimum value:
– ST = CS (ST = 1 iff CS = 1)
– BT = CB
– BS = max(SH,BH) (the bottle is shattered if one of the two hits it);
– SH = ST (whenever Suzy throws she hits); and
– BH = min(BT, 1−SH) (Bob hits the bottle if he throws and Suzy has not
already hit it; we assume that Suzy anticipates him).
We write X = x to express the fact that variable X has value x, in the given
model. We also write
#»
X = #»x , where
#»
X is a list X1, . . . Xn of variables and
#»x is a
list of values x1, . . . xn for such variable, for the conjunction X1 = x1∧. . .∧Xn =
xn.
A key notion in this approach is the idea of an intervention, which consists
of assignments of values to variables. We write X ← x to denote the assignment
of value x to a variable X, and write
#»
X ← #»x to denote that variables #»X are
assigned values #»x . Interventions produce counterfactual situations, namely the
intervention X ← x produces the situation that would result by changing what
was the value of X to its value as x. For instance, where we start with a situation
in which Suzy had thrown the ball, the intervention ST ← 0 produces the
counterfactual situation in which Suzy had not thrown the ball. Thus
#»
X ← #»x is
an abbreviations for {X1 ← x1, . . . Xn ← xn}.
The expression (M, #»u ) refers to the fact that the model M is initialised by
assigning values #»u to the exogenous variables
#»
U .
The notion of a cause is reduced to this idea of intervention: to determine
whether a certain event (the fact that certain variables had certain values) causes
a proposition to be true, we consider whether assigning such values to the vari-
ables would make that proposition true. For instance, to determine whether the
fact that Billy threw a stone, i.e., the fact that BT = 1, caused a bottle to be
shattered, we consider whether the proposition BS = 1 would still be true by
the intervention BT ← 0, i.e. were Billy not to have thrown the stone.
Let us now consider in detail the definition of an ‘actual cause’ by HP. To
qualify as an ‘actual cause’, an event has to satisfy the three conditions below,
denoted as AC1, AC2, AC3.
Condition AC1 states that the given model entails that both the cause
#»
X =
#»x and the effect ϕ have happened; that is, they hold in the same model and
assignment.
AC1. (M, #»u ) |= ( #»X = #»x ) and (M, #»u ) |= ϕ.
In the example of Suzy and Billy, if Suzy causes the bottle to be shattered,
it must be true that both she threw the stone (ST = 1) and the bottle was
shattered (BS = 1).
Condition AC2 includes two prongs, named AC2(a) and AC2(b).
For
#»
X = #»x to be a cause, there must be set of variables W and Z having
the following features (we can think of Z as including the variables whose values
are affected by the causal process generated by
#»
X = #»x , and W as the variables
involved in other causal processes).
AC2(a) provides a necessity condition under counterfactual circumstances.
In other words, had the cause not happened then the effect would not have
happened. More formally, had the variable
#»
X had value #»x ′ rather than #»x , and
had certain other circumstances taken place wherein variables
# »
W had values #»w,
the effect φ would not have taken place.
AC2(a). (M, #»u ) |= [ #»X ← #»x ′, # »W ← #»w]¬ϕ.
In our example, assume that
# »
W includes variable ST , and that we want to
establish whether Billy’s throw causes the bottle to shatter. To take into account
the possibility of multiple causes, we should consider the circumstance in which
Suzy had not thrown the stone (ST ← 0). The putative cause BT ← 1 meets
this condition AC2(a), since under if the cause had not happened (BT ← 0) and
Suzy had not thrown the stone (ST ← 0), then the bottle would not have been
shattered (BS ← 0).
Condition AC2(b) is the most complex one: it states that the cause would
have produced its effect even by assuming that no alternative causes are present,
but that perturbations exist such that causes may be determined in the causal
process being considered.
AC2(b). (M, #»u ) |= [ #»X ← #»x , # »W ′ ← #»w, #»Z ′ ← #»z ∗]ϕ for all subsets # »W ′of # »W,
and all subsets
#»
Z ′ of
#»
Z,
where we abuse the notation and write
# »
W ′ ← #»w to denote the assign-
ment where the variables in
# »
W ′ get the same values as they would in
the assignment
# »
W ← #»w (and similar for #»Z), while #»z ∗ denotes the values
that the variable in
#»
Z ′ had in reality (in the original model).
In our model, BT = 1 fails to meet the latter requirement, since the effect
BS = 1 does not exist when combining (a) the inclusion in
# »
W ′ ← #»w of the
counterfactual assumption Suzy does not throw (ST ← 0), with (b) the inclusion
in
#»
Z ← #»z ∗ of the fact that Bill does not hit the bottle (BH ← 0), i.e. the fact
that his action was pre-empted. If the model is modified in this way, it no longer
entails that the bottle is shattered. Finally, the last condition requires that the
cause of an effect must be non-redundant, i.e. no subset of it would meet the
first two conditions.
AC3.
#»
X is minimal; no subset of
#»
X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2.
ly could have been the real cause, but due to Suzy’s actions was preempted.
This is the same as in Suzy’s throw analysis, where AC1 and AC3 hold au-
tomatically. For AC2, the variables are as follows
#»
Z = {BT,BH,SH,BS},
# »
W{ST}, and w = 0. While AC2(a) remains the same as in Suzy’s analysis,
Billy’s hit fails to satisfy the sufficiency condition AC2(b). It is not the case that
M(1, 1) |= (BT ← 1, BH ← 1, ST ← 1, SH ← 0)BS = 1 because we already set
the causal model to include the structural dependencies between SH and BH; in
other words, it is impossible for Billy to hit the bottle once it has been hit by
Suzy.
Despite the scepticism around the hypothetical nature of these manipula-
tions, lawyers are often interested in what would have been the case if one or
more elements in the case had been different. For instance, if a nurse had mixed
up the doses of anaesthetic before the doctor used the wrong instrument in the
operating theatre. Both actions would have caused the patient’s death, but one
preempted the other. These and similar questions are at the core of many cases of
medical negligence, which are becoming increasingly difficult to analyse without
a causal framework, especially with questions relating to duty of care.
While HP’s ‘actual causality’ is an advanced approach and is able to model
the examples of overdetermination and preemption, it is highly technical and has
not yet been translated into a workable version for legal reasoners. Our aim, as
part of the development of the semi-formal argument framework, is to translate
these causal theories into the language of argument schemes proposing a best-
fit approach in the analysis of causal arguments. Without the incorporation of
the formal analysis into the language and concepts of legal reasoning, the use
of such models remains highly theoretical. We believe that with the increasing
complexity of cases brought to the medical courts, a solid framework for causal
argument assessment is necessary.
2.3 Causal Arguments: Towards a Semi-formal Approach
So far we have looked at three major theories that establish cause-in-fact through
various forms of logic. These theories differ from each other in their levels of re-
striction in defining causes and the complexity of the tests themselves, i.e. their
effectiveness in each of the causal situations. While all three approaches are able
to capture the cause-in-fact in direct causal scenarios, the hard cases of causal-
ity require broadening the causal criteria from the notions of pure necessity to
sufficiency and contingency-based analysis. As illustrated by the firing squad
and rock-throwing examples, NESS and ‘actual causality’ further distinguish
causal subsets that separate hypothetical from the real. Moreover, only HP ‘ac-
tual causality’ is able to capture the subtleties and order of events characteristic
to preemptive causes. In these problem examples we observed that there is a
cost in choosing one theory over the others. In particular, the ‘but-for’ test is
easy to apply, but it fails to capture the complexities of anything beyond non-
direct causal links. By contrast, the more complex theories are well-formalised
and provide more accuracy in capturing the cause, but remain counterintuive
and cumbersome to apply. Furthermore, it remains controversial whether the
increased accuracy of these approaches is a reasonable trade-off for the efforts
in applying them in law. Currently, the but-for test remains the dominant test
for causality in law, while causal sufficiency is discussed only in a limited set of
legal cases. None of the advanced theories are in themselves optimal for analysis
of causation in law at their current form. In particular, we believe that these
theories could be integrated in a richer framework that addresses the specificity
of legal reasoning and reasoning from expert witness testimonies.
We have observed that the analysis of causal arguments in law is a multilay-
ered process and involves establishing and then assessing the cause-in-fact based
on a number of criteria. One of the issues flagged by the judges and legal schol-
ars [17] is the blurred division between causal analysis based on evidence itself
and assessment based on legal norms and policies. Such a distinction is crucial
in events of complex causal phenomena. For instance, in the case of preemption
the results based on pure formal analysis would show that only the first actor
is the cause of the effect, which is counterintuitive to legal thinking where an
actor who has completed the action with intention to do harm should also be
held responsible. Care should be taken in translating a counterintuitive theory
in legal terms, as there is a growing scepticism of the formal theories in law. Yet,
law already contains loaded terms such as ‘legal cause’, ‘proximate cause’, and
‘material contribution’ that go beyond the cause-in-fact analysis and represent
policy-based considerations. All three causal theories make direct references to
their potential use in law, but the mixed nature of the causal reasoning in law
is either missed or underrated. When proposing our framework, we acknowledge
that the modelling and evaluation of cause-in-fact is the first step in the causal
analysis in law. It is followed by a long list of criteria, including legal rules, poli-
cies, and precedent cases to determine the liability attribution. In addition, it
is important to appreciate the limits of human reasoning, such as explicit and
implicit biases [20], and over-reliance on commonsense reasoning. Law neces-
sarily imposes constraints on the final outcome of the causal analysis for the
purposes of decision making. However, the uncertainty in legal reasoning should
not (entirely) undermine evidence based reasoning and formal analysis.
We propose the use of a semi-formal causal argumentation framework to nar-
row the gap between the formal causal theories and legal analysis. Such a frame-
work has two main functions. Firstly, it models the causal arguments based on
the language used by the legal reasoners in the case [21]. We abstract from the
case record and model the arguments using a notion of causal rules along with
strict and defeasible inferences. We use the causal rules and strengths of beliefs
about the causal links based on the arguments by the parties in the case. Sec-
ondly, with an eye towards future developments of the framework, we propose an
extension that allows to assess the causal arguments based on a unique selection
of criteria. These criteria include a list of causation specific critical questions,
evidential reasoning theories to assess the explanatory value of the arguments,
which weigh the arguments based on the notion of normality, and new task spe-
cific argumentation schemes designed on the basis of the three causal theories
analysed in this paper. The novelty of this proposal is in the way it assesses
causal arguments. In addition to the existing approaches to argument analysis,
we translate the formal causal theories into argument schemes to assess the un-
derlying causal structures of the arguments presented in the courts. A correct
application of the framework will result in further justification and increased
accuracy of the judge’s reasoning when assessing the cause-in-fact in the cases.
In the next section, we introduce the legal criteria, facts, and expert witness
testimonies of the Althen case. We then provide our framework for modelling
causal arguments, which is then applied to the Althen case.
2.4 The Althen Case
We use the Althen decision [1] for analysing the evidentiary and legal issues
regarding causation. In particular, we examine the expert witness testimonies
about the causal link between the vaccines and petitioner’s symptoms. Further-
more, we analyse how the special master compares and weights these arguments
to attribute legal responsibility. Our aim is to show the complexity of establish-
ing direct causation in a real case. We are particularly interested in unpacking
the legal criterion that requires evidence of a ‘logical sequence of cause and ef-
fect’. We claim that our semi-formal model is able to support the analysis by
the expert witnesses in satisfying this criterion.
Legal Criteria. In the US Vaccine Courts, a causal link is successfully proven
if the vaccine is either listed on the approved ‘Vaccine Injury Table’ or the
petitioner satisfies the cause-in-fact conditions set out by the court (also know
as, the off-table vaccine injury). This case involves an off-table vaccine injury.
The claimant’s burden (also known as the Stevens test) can be summarised as
follows: “the claimant has to show by preponderant evidence that the vaccination
brought about her injury by providing a medical theory causally connecting the
vaccination and the injury, a logical sequence of cause and effect showing that
the vaccination was the reason for the injury, and a showing of a proximate
temporal relationship between vaccination and injury; if the claimant satisfies
this burden, they are entitled to recover unless the government shows, also by a
preponderance of evidence, that the injury was in fact caused by factors unrelated
to the vaccine”.
Facts of the Case. The case concerns Mrs. Althen (petitioner) and her wors-
ening health conditions after receiving a tetanus toxoid vaccine (TTV). Prior
to the vaccine, petitioner was reasonably healthy. After roughly two weeks from
the vaccination date, petitioner started reporting various symptoms ranging from
blurred vision, to steady headache and temporal loss of vision. Patient’s health
complaints and hospital visits continued over the following three years. Peti-
tioner was exposed to various types of treatments and extensive medical testing
(MRI, EEG, blood tests) that showed inconclusive results for acute-disseminated
encephalomyelitis (ADEM), multiple sclerosis, and vasculitis. Subsequently pe-
titioner applied for compensation at the Vaccine Court, which requires that
petitioner establishes a causal link between the TTV and ADEM.
Expert Witness Testimonies. There were three medical expert witnesses as-
signed to this case, of which we discuss two competing testimonies. Dr. Smith
for petitioner arguing for the positive causal link between TTV and ADEM, and
Dr. Safran for respondent rejecting the causal link. While both experts agreed
that it is theoretically possible that the TTV could cause ADEM, they did not
agree on the general model being satisfied in this particular case. The main dis-
agreement between the experts was about the role of the TTV in demyelinating
the healthy cells in the patient (potentially leading to the ADEM). Dr. Smith
supported his opinion by referring to the medical theory of cell degeneracy, which
shows cell modification through evolution and can explain T cell reaction after
a vaccine. The theory of cell degeneracy is based on the premise that TTV can
attack and destroy both bad (antigen) and good (myelin) cells, as the antigen
and myelin are sufficiently similar. Dr. Safran denies the link in this particular
case on two grounds. Firstly, he argues that antigen and myelin cells are not
proven to be sufficiently similar to be mistaken by the active components of the
vaccine. Secondly, the symptoms observed on the patient can be better explained
by multiple sclerosis. Based on this information, which has been abstracted from
the case, we will model the causal explanations given by the experts. We chose
the focus of the expert arguments due to their significance in decision making at
the vaccine courts. Furthermore, these testimonies provide detailed information
on the causal claims made in the case, which are then carefully examined and
weighted by the special master to decide determine the responsibility attribution
in the case.
3 Semi-formal Framework and Case Analysis
In this section, we present a semi-formal framework for modelling and assessing
arguments about causal links. We then apply this framework to the Althen case
to capture the views expressed by Dr. Smith and Dr. Safran on the causal rela-
tionship between TTV and ADEM. Our analysis is meant to accommodate the
arguments about the causal relations that are presented by the expert witnesses,
in particular we focus on the disagreements between the parties and the under-
lying structure of the arguments. Other matters are out of scope at this moment,
e.g. the dynamics of dialogue, belief change, and time. It is a static model that
represents all the information available. It makes explicit some of the otherwise
implicit assumptions that are highlighted in the course of the presentation of the
expert testimony and by way of attack.
3.1 Semi-formal Framework
Our semi-formal framework is a propositional language to represent and reason
with basic facts/events and causal relations between them. Our model consists
of basic knowledge structures and rule schemes using these structures.
Basic Knowledge Structures. There are three basic knowledge structures:
factual propositions, predicates for similarity and evidentiality, causal links, and
inference rules.
Factual Propositions. A factual proposition has the form
±H(X)
where X is a positive or negative literal. H(X) states that the literal X holds
and ¬H(X) that this was not the case. For instance H(TTV ) and H(¬TTV ) are
such literals, affirming respectively, that it holds that tetanus toxoid vaccination
was performed, and that it holds that this was not the case. We assume that
H(X) and H(¬X) are incompatible, and that H(¬X) is indeed equivalent to (it
strictly implies and is implied by) ¬H(X). For instance H(¬TTV ) is equivalent
to ¬H(TTV )
Similarity and Evidentiality. In addition to the factual propositions, the experts
in the case also reason with similarity and evidentiality, which we introduce as
a relation and a predicate, respectively. We represent similarity as
Sim(X,W )
which is understood as the propositional content of X is similar to the proposi-
tional content of W (and vice versa). We represent evidentiality as
EV (X)
which is understood to represent the existence of evidence for the propositional
content of X.
Causal Links. Causal links are represented as
C(L,X, Y )
where L takes values 1 or 2, X and Y are factual propositions. L = 1 indicates
that cause X always (necessarily) produces effect Y , and L = 2 indicates that
cause X usually (normally) produces effect Y . The causal links and levels of
causal links loosely correspond to the language used by the reasoners.5 For in-
stance, C(1, TTV, TCellAct) is an expression that TTV and TCellActivation
have the always causal relation, as the witnesses present it.
Inference Rules. We use strict and defeasible inference rules represented as
X1 . . . Xn → Y
for strict rules, and
X1 . . . Xn ⇒ Y
for defeasible rules, where X1, . . . Xn, Y .
We assume that strict rules allow for contrapositive reasoning. For our pur-
poses it is sufficient the contrapositive inference where, given all antecedents of
a defeasible rule except X, and the negation of the rule’s consequent, we can
infer X’s negation. Thus we assume that a strict rule stands for the set of all of
its contrapositions. A contrapositive of a strict rule
X1 . . . Xn → Y
is a rule
X1 . . . Xi−1,¬Y,Xi+1, . . . Xn → ¬Xi
For instance, if a knowledge base contains the rule
H(X) ∧ C(1, X, Y )→ H(Y )
5 At the initial stages of the case study, we annotated the decision identifying causal
and accompanying hedging expressions. After identifying the main causal links in
the case, we ranked the various expressions in two levels of strength. For instance,
‘a probable causal relation between tetanus toxoid and two injuries’, ‘it is more prob-
ably than not the case that tetanus toxoid can cause the injuries suffered here’ are
examples of level 2 (usually causal) support.
it also contains a rule
¬H(Y ) ∧ C(1, X, Y )→ ¬H(X)
Accordingly, if Y does not hold and X strongly causes Y , we can infer that X
does not hold, for otherwise Y should hold.
To capture the reasoning of the experts in our cases, we need to supplement
the general framework above with some schemes for rules.
General Rule Schemes. There are general rule schemes for causal rules, sim-
ilarity, and evidence (including abduction).
Causal Rules. Rule schemes R1 and R2 capture the inferential relevance of causal
relations
[R1.]H(X) ∧ C(1, X, Y )→ H(Y )
captures the inferential meaning of necessary causal links. If the precondition
holds and the causal link is level 1, we strictly conclude that the effect holds.
[R2.]H(X) ∧ C(2, X, Y )⇒ H(Y )
captures the inferential meaning of defeasible causal links. If the precondition
holds and the causal link is level 2, we defeasibly conclude that the effect holds,
but can have exceptions.
Similarity. The case scenario also includes reasoning with similarity, in partic-
ular, it is assumed that similar facts cause the same effect. This is captured by
the following scheme for defeasible conditionals:
[R3.]Sim(X,W ) ∧ C(L,X, Y )⇒ C(L,W, Y )
Evidence. Finally, our experts reason with evidence. First, it is assumed that
having evidence for a proposition defeasibly implies that this proposition holds:
[R4.]EV (X)⇒ H(X)
Evidence plays two roles in our domain. First, it may establish facts that
contradict the conclusion of a causal inference. This will defeat the causal argu-
ment leading to the conclusion contradicted by the evidence. If that argument
culminates with the effect of a level 1 causal relation, defeat may extend to the
precondition of that causal relation via contraposition.
Second, evidence may provide abductive support for establishing the antecedent
of a level 1 causal relation. In fact, it seems that our experts assume that given
a necessary causal relation and its effect, we can abductively infer the precon-
dition. We capture this aspect of their reasoning through the following pattern
defeasible conditionals:
[R5.]H(Y ) ∧ C(1, X, Y )⇒ H(X)
meaning, that we can defeasibly infer the precondition X when we have estab-
lished its effect. For instance, given evidence of certain symptoms, we can infer
that these symptoms hold by R4; moreover, if such symptoms are strictly caused
by an illness, we can defeasibly infer that the illness holds by R5.
3.2 Models in the Language
In this section we apply the semi-formal framework to represent the relations as
described by the expert witnesses in the case. We shall use the following atoms,
representing the circumstances that are relevant to our case:
Factual Atoms
TTV - tetanus toxoid vaccination being injected in the patient
ADEM - acute-disseminated encephalomyelitis illness
MS - multiple sclerosis
TCellAct - the chemical process of tetanus toxoid vaccination activating T
cells
AntigDestr - antigen cells destroyed (T cells should target this, wanted
effect)
MlnDest - myelin cells destroyed (T cells should not target this, unwanted
effect)
Symp(Mono) - monophasic symptoms occur. This means that the symptoms
that occurred just once. −Symp(Mono) means here that the symptoms oc-
curred on multiple occasions.
We use the following causal links to represent the causal claims of the expert
witnesses:
C1. Tetanus toxoid vaccination always causes T-cell activation: C(1, TTV, TCellAct)
C2. T-cell activation always causes antigen destruction: C(1, TCellAct, AntigDestr)
C3. T-cell activation usually causes myelin destruction: C(2, TCellAct,MlnDestr)
C4. Myelin destruction usually causes ADEM: C(2,MlnDestr, ADEM)
C5. ADEM usually causes monophasic symptoms: C(2, ADEM,Symp(Mono))
C6. Multiple sclerosis usually causes recurrent symptoms: C(2,MS,−Symp(Mono))
3.3 The Arguments of the Expert Witnesses in Althen
We now model the arguments of Dr. Smith and Dr. Safran in Althen.
Dr. Smith Given the language and rules above, we model the reasoning by Dr.
Smith. He argues in favour of a causal link between the TT vaccine and ADEM.
His argument starts from the explicit assumption of TTV (given as a fact). Dr.
Smith’s argument is based on the explicit assumption Sim(AntigDestr,MlnDestr)
and implicit assumption C(2, ADEM,Symp(Mono)) (an assumption exposed
by another witness’s counter-argument). We take these assumptions as asser-
tions in Dr. Smith’s model. We give the assumptions, rules, and inferences in
sequence, labelling the reasoning steps by agent. The relations have been an-
notated leading back to the general rule schemes (R1-R5) and expert witness
claims (C1-C6).
Dr. Smith’s Model: The rules for Dr. Smith’s argument, based on the rules
proposed above
1. H(TTV ) [explicit assumption]
2. C(1, TTV, TCellAct) [from C1]
3. H(TTV ) ∧ C(1, TTV, TCellAct)→ H(TCellAct) [strict implication follow-
ing the causal rule R1]
4. H(TCellAct) [from 1, 2, and 3]
5. C(1, TCellAct, AntigDestr) [from C2]
6. Sim(AntigDest,MlnDest) [implicit (similarity) assumption by Dr.Smith]
7. Sim(AntigDest,MlnDest) ∧ C(1, TCellAct, AntigDestr)⇒
C(2, TCellAct,MlnDestr) [an instance of the rule scheme R3 showing de-
feasible inference]
8. C(2, TCellAct,MlnDestr) [from 5, 6, 7]
9. H(MlnDestr) [explicit assumption]
10. C(2,MlnDestr, ADEM) [from C4]
11. H(MlnDestr) ∧ C(2,MlnDestr, ADEM) ⇒ H(ADEM) [defeasible infer-
ence following the causal rule R2]
12. H(ADEM) [explicit assumption by Dr. Smith]
13. C(2, ADEM, Symp(Mono)) [from C5, causal claim by Dr. Smith]
14. H(ADEM) ∧ C(2, ADEM,Symp(Mono)) ⇒ H(Symp(Mono)) [defeasible
inference following the causal rule R2]
15. H(Symp(Mono)) [from 12, 13, 14]
To support the structural claims, Dr. Smith can also build an argument for
ADEM, this time based on the evidence of the symptoms.
1. EV (Symp(Mono)) [explicit assumption]
2. EV (Symp(Mono))⇒ H(Symp(Mono)) [following R4]
3. H(Symp(Mono)) [defeasible conclusion from 1, 2]
4. C(2, ADEM,Symp(Mono)) [from C5]
5. H(Symp(Mono)) ∧ C(2, ADEM,Symp(Mono)) ⇒ H(ADEM) [following
the abduction rule R5]
6. H(ADEM) [defeasible conclusion from 4,5]
Dr. Safran Dr. Safran’s objections against the causal link between the TTV
and ADEM can be summarised into two main arguments. Firstly, he argues
against Dr. Smith’s assumption (see steps 6-8 in Dr. Smith’s model) that myelin
and antigen cell destruction are sufficiently similar for the vaccine to make an
error in distinguishing between these processes.
This argument consists in the single claim
1. ¬Sim(AntigDest,MlnDest)
Secondly, Dr. Safran argues against the conclusions based on the assumption
of monophasic symptoms. He claims that the evidence shows that the symptoms
observed on the patient are reoccurring. He provides further support from the
medical literature showing that ADEM has been described as a monophasic
condition, consequently defeating Dr. Smith’s argument.
His argument against ADEM is is the following:
1. EV (C(1, ADEM,Symp(Mono))) [explicit assumption by Dr. Safran]
2. EV (C(1, ADEM,Symp(Mono))) ⇒ C(2, ADEM,Symp(Mono)) [follow-
ing R4]
3. C(2, ADEM,Symp(Mono)) [from 1,2,3]
4. ¬H(Symp(Mono)) [explicit assumption]
5. ¬H(Symp(Mono))∧C(1, ADEM,Symp(Mono))→ ¬H(ADEM) [by trans-
position of the ruleH(ADEM)∧C(1, ADM,Symp(Mono))→ H(Symp(Mono)]
6. ¬H(ADEM) [defeasible conclusion from 4,5]
Furthermore, Dr. Safran provides an alternative explanation of the recurrent
symptoms linking them with multiple sclerosis.
1. C(2,MS,¬Symp(Mono)) [from C6]
2. H(¬Symp(Mono)) [explicit assumption]
3. H(MS)∧C(2,MS,¬Symp(Mono))⇒ H(¬Symp(Mono)) [defeasible infer-
ence from R2]
4. H(MS) [defeasible conclusion from 1, 2, 3]
Multiple sclerosis provides an explanation of the evidence, as he sees it, i.e. as
including non-monophasic (recurrent) symptoms H(¬Symp(Mono)).
In summary, following the burden of the proof rules in Althen, Dr. Smith
had to provide an evidentially supported argument about the causal relation-
ship between the TT vaccine and ADEM. He provided such a model based on the
similarity assumptions between the cells and further implicit assumptions about
the monophasic symptoms and ADEM. For the causal proof to be shown insuf-
ficient, the proponent’s expert witness either had to defeat Dr. Smith’s model or
provide an alternative causal explanation of the facts. Based on the arguments
presented, we modelled both instances defeating the causal link between TTV
and ADEM. It is important to emphasise that in the real case the cause-in-fact
analysis constituted only the first step for the liability attribution and ultimately
the case was decided against the claimant due to the lack of supportive evidence
for the causal link between the vaccine and ADEM in the medical literature.
3.4 Interim Conclusions
The case analysis so far provides an illustration of a use of our semi-formal
framework and its ability to capture and model the core points of the expert
witness arguments in the Althen case. In addition to modelling the causal rela-
tions and their relative strengths, we have begun the integration of evidential
reasoning from the evidence to a supported conclusion. A carefully developed ev-
idential reasoning implementation could be especially helpful in legal reasoning
where the parties are expected to justify their arguments by showing how the
evidence links to their claims. We also observed that there is a mix of everyday
and legal causal expressions with causal language often being accompanied by
hedging expressions. We integrated different degrees of belief in causal links to
represent the nature of discussions in the court, where the expert witnesses and
decision-maker often use the language of uncertainty. This suggests a possible
extensions based on statistical approaches to further improve the causal models
to reflect causal reasoning present in the courtrooms.
4 Discussion and Future Work
In the final section of this paper, we discuss the need for a multilayered ap-
proach to causal analysis in law and introduce an early proposal for building an
extension to the current framework. Such an extension would include assessment
criteria based not only on the critical question [27] and evidential reasoning [3]
approaches, but would also include a novel integration of the but-for, NESS, and
‘actual causation’ theories to assess the strength of the causal arguments.
In this paper, we presented the initial steps in the development of a com-
prehensive modelling and assessment framework designed for causal argument
analysis in law. The interim results of modelling the vaccine injury case showed
that the basic notions introduced are easily transferable from argument to ar-
gument. It is also possible to substitute some of the basic relations to suit the
case at hand. For instance, in Althen’s, the disagreement stemmed from the
similarity relation (Sim) between the cells. In other vaccine injury cases, the
core disagreement might rely on a different notion, e.g. compatibility of certain
chemical compounds of different vaccines. In contrast, the framework’s causal
and evidential rule schemes can be directly reused and generalised for other
cases, providing that the new case specific variables are added to the models.
The argument modelling in the semi-formal framework successfully uncovered a
list of hidden premises and implicit inferences, and it provided additional sup-
port for the judge’s decision. However, modelling in itself is not enough to assess
and compare competing arguments.
As it currently stands, causal analysis in law still poses a lot of unanswered
questions and there are no comprehensive guidelines for causal argument analy-
sis in the courts [1]. The absence of a common assessment framework of complex
notions like overdetermination, preemption, and omission can result in reduced
consistency between judgements, increased level of subjectivity and lack of trans-
parency. We believe that better understanding of the causal links and causal
arguments would allow to improve these guidelines. Moreover, causal arguments
also play an important role in the liability attribution and burden of proof de-
bates [22].
Therefore, we share some ideas for an extension of our framework to include
a list of argument assessment criteria. These would be based on the argument
schemes and critical questions [27], evidential reasoning theories [3], norm based
analysis, and an integration of causal theories discussed in this paper (but-for,
NESS, and HP’s ‘actual causation’ ). The latter is a novel proposal in legal anal-
ysis as it would support an interdisciplinary approach to causal argument as-
sessment in decision making. As we have shown in the causal theory section
(Section 2.2), each of the causal approaches has certain advantages in capturing
the causes and effects. Our aim is to translate the intuitions and formalisations
of the NESS and ‘actual causation’ three prong test into argument schemes that
use the basic notions of ASPIC+ [16], enabling inferences from the knowledge
base. These argument schemes will be used to assess the underlying logical struc-
ture [5] of causal links and how well the particular causal arguments are justified.
We acknowledge that cause-in-fact is not the sole source of arguments in legal
decision-making and strive for a framework that would also support norm-based
analysis. One of the aims is to unpack some of the causal logic behind the pol-
icy based considerations of ‘legal cause’ and ‘material contribution’, which have
been claimed to remedy a strict application of logic [17].
The goal of this research is to develop an approach that identifies, formally
models, and supports reasoning with causation in a manner that is relevant to
the legal domain. This paper presents the modelling steps of the overall research
objective as identified in [7]. In this paper, we have mainly focused on represent-
ing simple causal relations that are expressed through complex arguments in the
court. The proposed inference rules can be reused to model similar cases in the
vaccine court, and have the potential to model a large variety of causal issues.
We also assessed three dominant causal theories modelling the underlying logical
structure of causation. This analysis serves as an initial step for building an ex-
tension to the semi-formal framework. As part of the future work, we intend to
use the methods and insights developed here to tackle more challenging causal
issues. Furthermore, we have begun building an extension to provide a way to
compare and assess the causal arguments. We aim to integrate the causal tests
of the three theories and the modelling framework discussed in this paper. In its
current state, the framework represents the causal links as understood by the
expert reasoners and the judge, while the causal theories discuss how the logical
structure of such links can be assessed. There is a lot more that needs to be
done to understand and automate the arguments and reasoning based on causal
models. However, in accord with the other specialists in the field [14] we believe
that it is work worth pursuing in order to understand the complex nature of
legal reasoning and argumentation while respecting the practical constrains of
legal discourse.
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